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REPLENISHING THE INK OF THE POISON
PEN: RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF § 43(a)
OF THE LANHAM ACT IN GARLAND CO. V.
ECOLOGY ROOF SYSTEMS CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a single correspondence containing allegedly false informa-
tion give rise to a violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act1 as
commercial advertising or promotion? On July 12, 1995, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas, ruling on a matter of first
impression in the Tenth Circuit against a backdrop of split
authority, said no.2 The implications of this holding are quite
extensive; businesses that rely on nontraditional advertising
channels3 for commercial benefit will suffer due to the court's
restrictive definition of the disputed language "commercial
advertising or promotion."4
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Garland involved two manufacturers of roofing materials who
were competing for a project initiated by the Lawrence School
District in Lawrence, Kansas.' The plaintiff, The Garland Compa-
ny, Incorporated (hereinafter Garland), alleged that the defendant,
Ecology Roof Systems Corporation, (hereinafter Ecology) sent to
Diamond Everly Roofing Contractors (hereinafter Diamond Everly),
one of the contractors bidding on the project, a letter purporting to
compare the characteristics of the roofing materials manufactured
by the two companies.' Garland contended that Ecology's letter
contained false and misleading representations of fact concerning
Garland's roofing materials in order to convince Diamond Everly to
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
' Garland Co. v. Ecology Roof Sys. Corp., 895 F. Supp. 274, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1563
(D. Kan. 1995).
' For example, word-of-mouth as an advertising medium.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1125(aX1XB) (Supp. V 1993).
'Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 275.
'Id.
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use Ecology's products.7 Garland additionally alleged that Dia-
mond Everly showed this letter and data to the Lawrence School
District, and as a result the District elected to use the roofing
materials manufactured by Ecology over those made by Garland,
and awarded the building contract to Diamond Everly.'
Garland subsequently brought a claim against Ecology for an
alleged violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.9 Section 43(a)
establishes a civil cause of action by which a person who believes
that his goods or services have been misrepresented or falsely
described "in commercial advertising or promotion" may bring suit
against the perpetrator of the disparaging communication.' °
In its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,1" Ecology
contended that the single correspondence that it sent to Diamond
Everly did not meet the requirements of the "commercial advertis-
ing or promotion" provision of § 43(a), because the single correspon-
dence did not constitute advertisement or promotion in the relevant
industry. 2 Garland argued that since the letter containing the
alleged misrepresentations and false information was delivered by
Ecology to a consumer or buyer of Garland's materials, it satisfied
the "commercial advertising or promotion" requirement of §
43(a).13 The United States district court, acknowledging that this
7 id.
Sld.
9 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 275.
10 The applicable section provides:
(a) Civil Action. (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which-
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(aX1XB) (Supp. V 1993).
" Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 275.
12 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276. Defendant Ecology contended that since its letter had
been sent to only one roofing contractor out of a nationwide roofing materials industry, its
behavior was insufficient to satisfy this requirement. Id.
13 Id.
354 [Vol. 3:353
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case presented an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit,14
declined to adopt Garland's position, and consequently granted
Ecology's motion to dismiss by concluding that the single correspon-
dence sent to Diamond Everly did not meet the "commercial
advertising or promotion" requirement of § 43(a).15
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court in Garland first engaged in statutory interpretation in
an attempt to determine the precise meaning of the terms "commer-
cial advertising or promotion" as contained in § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.'" After finding that neither term was specifically
defined in the Act, 7 the court then resorted to a dictionary" to
find definitions for the terms.
The court concluded that it was "apparent" that each concept
carried with it "a notion of public dissemination of information
which [went] beyond one isolated letter to a single potential
customer." 9 It noted that Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defined "advertising" as "the action of calling something
(as a commodity for sale, a service offered or desired) to the
attention of the public [especially] by means of printed or broadcast
paid announcements" and "the business or profession of designing
and preparing advertisements for publication or broadcast."2"
Webster's went on to define the term "promotion" as "active
furtherance of sale of merchandise through advertising or other
publicity."" Upon reading these definitions the court conceded
that whereas it was easy to conclude that the definition of "adver-
tising" carried with it the notion of public dissemination, this
14 Id. at 276.
'5 Id. at 279.
" Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276. The court looked at the plain meaning of the statutory
language, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
& Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("Statutory construction must begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.').
1G Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276.
"Id. at 276 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)).
Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276.
20 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 31-32 (1986)).2 11d. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1815 (1986)).
1996] 355
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inference was not as easy to make with respect to the meaning of
"promotion."" Nevertheless, the court reached the conclusion that
each term contemplated the idea of an organized campaign, or at
least communications to a number of potential customers.' In
other words, the court asserted that each term connoted communi-
cation beyond the scope of a single letter such as had been sent by
Ecology to Diamond Everly.24
Inasmuch as it had admitted that the plain meaning of the term
"promotion" was less commonly established than that of the term
"advertising,"' the court next attempted to ascertain Congress'
intent behind its insertion of the word "promotion" by examining
the legislative history of the Lanham Act.' It then declared,
however, that the endeavor provided little insight, since the
pertinent language, meaning the language encompassing the term
"promotion," had been added in 1988 by an amendment to the Act
for which Congress provided few clues.2 7 Consequently, the court
concluded that there was nothing in the statute or its legislative
history to indicate that Congress had meant for the terms "adver-
tising" and "promotion" to be any more broadly defined in the
Lanham Act than had been suggested by Webster's.'
Next, the court turned to the relevant case law for assistance. It
found that decisions regarding the subject at hand were few, and
further noted the absence of any appellate court opinion dealing
squarely with the issue of whether a single communication could
fall under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'
Therefore, the court relied primarily on the reasoning of the
district court in Medical Graphics Corp. v. SensorMedics Corp.3"
to reach its decision in favor of Ecology. The court in Medical
"arland, 895 F. Supp. at 276.
"Id.24 d. at 276.
2Id.
2 id.
' Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276-77. The court concluded that an investigation of the
legislative history shed little light regarding the insertion of the term "promotion' into the
pertinent amendment, and furthermore, that it revealed little information with respect to
the body of Lanham Act itself in defining the term.
28 Id. at 277.
9id.
3o 872 F. Supp. 643, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (D. Minn. 1994).
[Vol. 3:353356
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/5
§ 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
Graphics had held that disparaging remarks made by the defen-
dant via "marketing flashes"3 and other memoranda 32 to the
plaintiffs then present and potential customers fell outside of the
scope of the Lanham Act. The court more precisely found that the
various representations at issue primarily consisted of statements
made by one of a handful of sales representatives to an individual
potential customer.' It accordingly denied plaintiffs motion for
a preliminary injunction.'
The court in Medical Graphics first observed that although the
defendant's conduct fell outside the boundaries of a traditional
advertising campaign, this fact would not necessarily defeat the
plaintiffs claim.' It then looked to the four-prong test used in
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers SA v. American Institute of
Physics 36 for guidance regarding whether defendant's conduct
could qualify as "commercial advertising or promotion" within the
meaning of § 43(a). The factors used by that court were:
(1) the representations must be commercial speech;
(2) they must be made by a defendant who is in
commercial competition with the plaintiff;
(3) they must be made for the purpose of influencing
customers to buy defendant's goods or services; and
(4) they must be disseminated sufficiently to the
relevant purchasing public to constitute "advertising"
or "promotion" within that industry.37
31 These "marketing flashes," which SensorMedics distributed to its own sales force,
included information on the merchandise of both SensorMedics and its competitors. Id. at
644.
' These memoranda contained remarks regarding plaintiffs alleged troubles with the
Food and Drug Administration, its alleged status as a German company masquerading as
an American company, and other remarks concerning the quality of plaintiff's products. Id.
at 645-46.
33 872 F. Supp. at 650.
3 Id. at 651.
3 AId. at 650.
36 859 F. Supp. 1521, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
37 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 277 (citing Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v.
American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
1996] 357
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The court in the present case noted the Medical Graphics' court's
discussion of the defendant's focus on the fourth prong of the
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers39 test. That court declared
that the level of circulation required to constitute advertising and
promotion would vary across industries and from case to case, and
that both "advertising" and "promotion" included in their meanings
a notion of the public dissemination of information.4 Using its
findings on the nature of the industry as a backdrop to the
defendant's actions,41 the court then concluded that the state-
ments made by the defendant about the plaintiff were not suffi-
ciently disseminated to the public, and accordingly held that they
would not be actionable as "commercial advertising or promo-
tion."' 2 The court in Garland concluded that the reasoning of the
Medical Graphics court was consistent with the plain meaning of
the Lanham Act and applicable to the facts of the instant case.43
The court in Garland further supported its holding through a
policy-based rationale which argued that allowing a single corre-
spondence to constitute a violation of the Lanham Act would permit
courts to sweep within the scope of the Act any damaging comment
made in a commercial context.4 4 The court opined that § 43(a) did
not contemplate such a broad incorporation, and accordingly the
court maintained that future plaintiffs would continue to be
protected from such allegedly disparaging communications through
judicial redress via the common law torts of defamation, interfer-
ence with contractual relationships, or interference with business
872 F. Supp. at 650.
859 F. Supp. at 1521.
"0 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 277 (citing Medical Graphics Corp., 872 F. Supp. at 650).
Whereas the court in Medical Graphics provided no explanation for these conclusions, the
Garland court may at least be commended for its more thorough search for a meaning of the
terms "advertising" and "promotion." See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
"' The court noted that "the potential market for the products at issue was large."
Medical Graphics Corp., 872 F. Supp. at 650. See infra note 87 and accompanying text for
the Garland court's comparable finding.
" Medical Graphics Corp., 872 F. Supp. at 650.
43Id.
"Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 278; see also American Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew
Pearson Mktg., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1072, 1078, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (N.D. 111. 1993)
(holding single letter addressed to nonconsuming licensor regarding licensee's purported
termination of distributorship agreement was not "commercial advertising and promotion"
within meaning of Lanham Act).
[Vol. 3:353358
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expectancy or economic advantage beyond the advertising con-
text.
45
Finally, the Garland court refused to adopt the reasoning of the
district court in Mobius Management Systems, Inc. v. Fourth
Dimension Software, Inc.," which held that a single correspon-
dence could constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" even
though it had not been disseminated to the general public. That
court also utilized the aforementioned Gordon & Breach Science
Publishers test 47 and noted that the troublesome analysis came
with the use of the fourth prong of the test.4' According to the
court in Garland, however, the court in Mobius concluded that the
reason for Congress' inclusion of the language "commercial
advertising or promotion" in § 43 of the Lanham Act was only to
ensure that the statute did not cover political, social, informational,
or incidental representations as to a competitor's product.49 In
other words, the Mobius court rejected the belief that the language
was necessarily meant to supply a stringent standard requiring the
presence of a traditional advertising campaign to constitute a §
43(a) violation. Nonetheless, the Garland court declined to adopt
the Mobius court's broad construction of the terms "commercial
advertising or promotion,"' and consequently disagreed with that
court's position that because the letter was aimed directly at a
purchaser, it could constitute sufficient dissemination.1
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN LANHAM ACT CLAIM FOR
FALSE ADVERTISING
In 1954, the Third Circuit was the first to extend the Lanham
Act to cover false advertising in 1954 in a case in which a plaintiff
dressmaker successfully brought a claim against a competitor for
"Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 278.
4 880 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).47 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
4
8 Mobius Management Sys., 880 F. Supp. at 1020. The Mobius court noted the difficulty
of deciding whether the letter was disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public
to constitute "advertising" or "promotion" within that industry.
9 Id.
'o See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
61 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 279.
1996] 359
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advertising an inferior dress but using a picture of plaintiffs
dress.5 2 In a reversal of the decision of the trial court, it held that
the Lanham Act prohibited unfair competition through false
advertising. It likened the statutory tort to the common law tort
of unfair competition. 53 For several years after that ruling,
however, the tort of false advertising was limited to false claims
made by an advertiser about his own products, and did not
encompass disparaging remarks he made about the products of his
competitor."M This narrow interpretation ended when a district
court in Illinois held that it was illogical to exclude the latter
category from falling under the coverage of the statute.5 5  Con-
gress agreed, and as part of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988" established a private cause of action for those damaged by
misrepresentations or false statements made about their products
or services by competitors.57 This characteristic thus distin-
guished the statute from the common law tort previously in
existence."M The Sixth Circuit has said:
Protecting consumers from false or misleading
advertising ... is an important goal of the statute
and a laudable public policy to be served.... [C]om-
petitors have the greatest interest in stopping
52 L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94 (3d
Cir. 1954); see also Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug
Advertising: Litigating False Scientific Establishment Claims Under the Lanham Act, 22
SETON HALL L. REV. 389, 409 (1992).
SL'Aiglon Apparel, 214 F.2d at 651. This comparison becomes ironic when the court in
Garland refers to these torts as an alternative to the statutory tort.
u Id.
' Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (holding that competitor's false, misleading, deceptive and incomplete statements
concerning plaintiff's products, causing plaintiff to suffer loss of customers and decline in
goodwill stated cause of action whereby plaintiff could recover damages and equitable relief
under Lanham Act).
5Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). It
is more commonly referred to as § 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act.
57 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27.04
[11[b], at 27-37 (3d ed. 1995); see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
"The common law had extended protection only against advertisers' misrepresentations
of their own products; see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, at 27-36 (citing Vidal Sassoon, Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24 (2d Cir. 1981); U-Haul Int'l, Inc.
v. Jartran, Inc. 681 F.2d 1159, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1077 (9th Cir. 1982)).
360 [Vol. 3:353
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misleading advertising, and a private cause of action
under section 43(a) allows those parties with the
greatest interest in enforcement, and in many
situations with the greatest resources to devote to a
lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously. Public
policy, therefore, is indeed well served by permitting
misrepresentation of quality claims to be actionable
under section 43(a).59
As McCarthy observed in his treatise on trademark law, Congress
enacted § 43(a) to ensure the right of the consumer to be told the
truth;' in other words, he wrote, Congress intended to allow a
competitor to file suit "to stop the kind of unfair competition that
consists of lying about goods or services, when it occurs in inter-
state commerce."61
To prevail in a Lanham Act claim for false advertising, the
modem plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant has made false or mislead-
ing statements... ; (2) that there is actual deception
or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial
portion of the intended audience; (3) that the decep-
tion is material in that it is likely to influence
purchasing decisions; (4) that the advertised goods
traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) that there is
a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of
declining sales, loss of good will, etc.62
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, at 27-38 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
822 F.2d 28, 31, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (6th Cir. 1987)).
sold.
611d. (citing Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 784 (N.D. M11. 974)).
2 Walsh, supra note 52, at 413 (citing U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914,
922-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990) (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input
Graphics, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 165, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1982))).
1996]
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Congress made its intent to protect consumers from the effects of
false advertising quite clear in the 1989 rewriting of § 43(a).63
V. CASE LAW
The few courts that have attempted to resolve issues similar to
those presented in Garland are split as to what they believe
Congress intended through its inclusion of the terms "commercial
advertising or promotion" within § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
schism in the courts surrounds the quality and quantity of
communications they believe those terms purport to encompass.
On one hand several courts have chosen to endow the terms
"commercial advertising or promotion" with a very narrow meaning
including only those communications associated with traditional
advertising. For example, courts have limited the scope of § 43(a)
by holding, similar to the instant case, that the ordinary meanings
of the terms "advertising" and "promotion" indeed include the
notion of public dissemination of information."
In those cases which adopted the narrow construction of the
terms "commercial advertising or promotion," the courts focused
heavily upon the nature of the disputed communication. One court,
which held that a letter sent by a licensee to its licensor's officials
regarding a purported termination of a distributorship agreement
did not constitute a violation of § 43(a),' noted that the letter at
issue had been addressed to a nonconsuming licensor." That
court maintained this type of correspondence was at the opposite
pole of clearly definable media advertising containing specific
6 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 58, at 27-40. The statutory language "prohibits any false or
misleading description or representation of fact which misrepresents the 'nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin' of the advertiser's goods, services or
commercial activities or those of others." Id. This detail is especially important to this
Article's forthcoming analysis.
" See, e.g., Medical Graphics Corp. v. SensorMedics Corp., 872 F. Supp. 643 (D. Minn.
1994) (finding that defendant's conduct did not fall within boundaries of traditional
advertising campaign); American Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., Inc., 820
F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that ordinary meanings of terms "advertising" and
"promotion" include notion of public dissemination of information).
' American Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D.
Ill. 1993).
66 Id. at 1078. According to American Needle, this letter contained several false and
defamatory statements regarding American Needle's business methods. Id. at 1075.
362 [Vol. 3:353
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verifiable or disprovable statements and given wide distribution in
commerce.
67
On the other hand, other courts construe the terms "commercial
advertising or promotion" more broadly so as to include a wider
variety of communications under § 43(a). For instance, the Sixth
Circuit in Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., supported the proposition
that to be actionable under the Lanham Act, commercial speech
need not resemble a typical advertisement.m Moreover, a letter
sent by a competitor to a single consumer constituted "commercial
advertising or promotion" under the Lanham Act in Mobius
Management Systems, Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc.69
Additionally, plaintiffs have prevailed when courts found that a
memo designed to influence purchasing decisions,70 a false repre-
sentation regarding a patent infringement, 71 and the limited
circulation of a price agreement bulletin 72 all raised viable Lan-
ham Act claims. A federal district in Illinois, in North Shore
Medical Center, Ltd. v. Evanston Hospital Corp., has even declared
that a defendant's argument that § 43(a) reached only those forms
of misrepresentations which occur in commercial advertising was
, The court noted that the letter was "an isolated individualized written statement....
Id.
68 52 F.3d 108, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that article in trade
journal contained sufficient promotional material to constitute commercial advertising under
§ 43(a) of Lanham Act). The court in Semco cited Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983), for the aforementioned proposition regarding commercial speech. Id. at 112.
In Bolger, the Supreme Court had observed that the combination of references to specific
products and the economic motivation behind the publishing of such materials would
constitute the existence of commercial speech. Bolger, 463 at 67 n.13; accord, Radio Today,
Inc. v. Westwood One, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that Lanham Act does
not apply merely to advertising through traditional media channels, but to broad range of
deceptive communications made in commercial context).
Mobius Management Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (S.D.N.Y 1991) (holding statements made in context involving
plugging of business services could be a claim under § 43(a)).7 0 Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1091
(N.D. Ill. 1983).
7' Brandt Consol., Inc. v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F. Supp. 164, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341
(C.D. Ill. 1992).
72N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 632 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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"without merit."73
Those courts which have adopted a broader interpretation of the
terms "commercial advertising or promotion" have generally looked
more at the effects of the communication on the intended audience
than on the nature of the communication itself. A number have
based rulings for the plaintiff on the reasonably foreseeable impact
of the defendant's conduct. For instance, the plaintiff prevailed in
Brandt Consolidated, Inc. v. Agrimar Corp. because the court
believed that the type of communication involved in the case was
likely to have a direct and major impact in diverting sales from the
plaintiff to the defendant.74 Additionally, the court in National
Artists Management Co. v. Weaving found for the plaintiff based on
actual impact of the defendants' conduct, which had resulted in
defection of clients from the plaintiff's agency.75
Clearly, there exists a great difference in opinion among the
courts which have dealt with this question. It appears that a
court's choice of focus within its analysis of the scope of § 43(a) is
central to its conclusion. Plaintiffs have generally found more
success when courts adopt a broader interpretation of "commercial
advertising or promotion" by choosing to focus on the effects of the
disputed communication, rather than on the character of the
communication itself. The Garland court's resolution of the issue
is certainly illustrative of the veracity of this proposition.
VI. ANALYSIS
The author disagrees with the holding of Garland Co. v. Ecology
Roof Systems Corp., and proposes a broader reading of the terms
"commercial advertising or promotion" than that adopted by the
court. A look at the legislative history of § 43(a), along with an
73 1993 WL 141717, at *3 (N.D. Ill.). The court also declared that the Lanham Act has
a broad remedial purpose and reaches a wide array of misrepresentations that a defendant
makes about his own, or another's, products or services.
7' 801 F. Supp. 164, 174 (C.D. Ill. 1992); Towers Fin. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 803
F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding ernoinment of defendant's conduct due to belief
that offending report would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff upon release); see also N.S.
Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that
defendant's conduct would result in wholesale diversion of plaintiffs customers to defendant).
7" 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court concluded that the defendants'
word-of-mouth disparagement had been an effective "advertising campaign.*
364 (Vol. 3:353
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/5
§ 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
examination of the court's flawed analysis concerning legislative
history, statutory interpretation, and the value of alternate redress
will demonstrate the error of the Garland court's ways.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 43(a)
One may first refer to the Congressional Record for support of a
broader construction of the disputed language "commercial
advertising or promotion." Whereas the court in Garland lamented
the dearth of clues on the subject,76 an examination of the Con-
gressional debates concerning the adoption of the 1988 Amend-
ments to the Lanham Act does in fact reveal some of the intent
behind the insertion of the language "commercial advertising and
promotion." 7 Although the Senate was skeptical of the inclusion
of the language, at the insistence of the House, it let the language
remain, maintaining that "the word 'commercial' [was] intended
only to eliminate any possibility that [§ 43(a)] might be applied to
political speech." (emphasis added). 7 Further reading of the
debate reveals that Congress intended that "the 'commercial'
language be applicable any time there [was] a representation
relating to goods or services,"79 in order to ensure the inclusion of
nonprofit organizations under the Act.80 In light of these Congres-
sional declarations, a broader reading of the disputed language
should be preferred and the conclusion reached that the "slippery
slope" argument advanced by the court in Garland based on the
reasoning of American Needle is without merit."' "Commercial
advertising or promotion" should be interpreted more liberally,
which is consistent not only with Congressional intent, but also
7 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276-77.
"See generally, Paul A. Batista, A Revolution for the 1990s: Commercial Defamation, the
Lanham Act and the Federal Courts, N.Y. ST. B.J., July/Aug. 1992, at 14 (discussing new,
broader framework for imposition of liability created via enactment of 1988 amendments to
Lanham Act).
78 134 CONG. REC. S16,971-01 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).79Id.
80 ld.
"' American Needle, 820 F. Supp. at 1078. The court in American Needle expressed
concern that to give the phrase "commercial advertising or promotion" a broader meaning
would be to sweep within its ambit all disparaging speech made in the context of a
commercial transaction. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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with the Supreme Court's opinion in a pronouncement regarding
the meaning of "commercial speech."82 The Court defined "com-
mercial speech" as expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience,' and this definition
appears to encompass the communication at issue in the instant
case.
B. CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The distinctions drawn between the facts in Garland and in
Mobius Management Systems by the Garland court reveal a
significant flaw in its argument. The court in Garland noted that
the disputed communication was "purely isolated, directed at one
contractor at one job."s' Recall the statement made by the court
in reference to Medical Graphics,' the case which constituted its
primary source of authority: the Medical Graphics court asserted
the level of circulation required to constitute advertising and
promotion will vary from industry to industry and case to case.'
The Garland court in part justified its disagreement with the court
in Mobius by attesting to the nationwide scope of the roofing
materials industry. 7 It then improperly concluded that since the
disputed communication reached only one contractor at one job it
did not constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" within the
meaning of the Lanham Act.
When a party focuses on winning the business of one particular
client, and thus is dealing with an audience of one, it should be
irrelevant that a nationwide group of other potential customers
exists as well. These other customers may be appealed to subse-
quently in other focused and separate negotiations, at which time
they will be considered the truly relevant audience. The court
failed to see that a single letter to the one client with whom the
' Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
(holding unconstitutional regulation of New York Public Service Commission which banned
promotional advertising by utility).
83 id.
Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 279.
"872 F. Supp. 643 (D. Minn. 1994).
Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 277 (citing Medical Graphics Corp., 872 F. Supp. at 650).87 Id. at 279.
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advertiser is currently attempting to do business constitutes one
hundred per cent saturation of the potential market at that
particular time. To decide otherwise is to ignore the language of
Medical Graphics which forecast that the required level of dissemi-
nation would vary from case to case. In this case, the contractor
customer became the "target audience" at the time he received the
letter containing the alleged misrepresentations. That letter
effectively constituted a personalized advertising campaign directed
to the contractor. Certainly the court in Medical Graphics would
recognize that in Garland the sufficient level of dissemination had
been achieved; after all, the communication was absolutely
effective. Notwithstanding this point, it is important to recognize
that the degree of ultimate impact of a disputed communication,
although very important, is not the court's only consideration;
however, as in this case, the letter's absolute success may serve as
evidence of sufficient saturation of the relevant market at issue, a
component which clearly plays a principal role in the court's
analysis.
One may next observe the question-begging nature and the
court's subsequent misapplication of the fourth prong of the Gordon
& Breach Science Publishers test~s in determining whether
defendant's conduct constitutes "commercial advertising or
promotion" under § 43(a). Remember the fourth prong as cited in
Garland:
[The allegedly disparaging communication] must
be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchas-
ing public to constitute "advertising" or "promotion"
within that industry."9
First of all, the words "the relevant purchasing public" are open
to interpretation. After all, that group which constitutes "the
relevant purchasing public" will vary from transaction to transac-
tion, a point stressed by the court in Medical Graphics, the
859 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers SA v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp.
1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1996] 367
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Garland court's primary source of authority." Moreover, one
could easily argue that Ecology sent the allegedly disparaging letter
to the relevant purchasing public, which was Diamond Everly. It
was Diamond Everly's reading of the letter and its subsequent
transmission to the Lawrence School District which led to the
school district's choice of materials and choice of contractor. It
should be apparent that Garland lost a customer as a direct result
of the contents of that letter from Ecology.
In addition, the words "to constitute 'advertising' or 'promotion'
within that industry" have a circular quality about them; in other
words, they state a conclusory argument by setting a guideline
which needs an explanation in and of itself. The court in Gordon
& Breach Science Publishers does not give guidance as to what
would be sufficient so as to constitute "advertising" or "promotion."
That court's technique and choice of wording is akin to using a
particular word in an attempt to define the same word. We still
are left wondering what constitutes "advertising or promotion," as
that court declined to give us a definition. Therefore, the Gordon
& Breach Science Publishers test provides a shaky framework for
analysis at best. Nevertheless, the court in Garland chose to gloss
over this point, assuming that the allegedly disparaging letter had
automatically failed the test. The court did so without actually
examining what was being tested and without questioning the
validity of the test at all.
Furthermore, the Garland court's belief that the nonconsuming
status of the person who received the letter in American Needle was
not critical to that court's analysis is unsound. The court in
Garland treated this issue briefly in a footnote,9 as did the court
in Mobius.92  The Garland court improperly suggested that
although the facts in the case American Needle & Novelty, Inc. v.
Drew Pearson Marketing93 were "arguably distinguishable" from
the facts of Garland in that American Needle involved a nonconsu-
ming licenser rather than a consumer, that factor did not form the
' In fact, this notion helped lead the Medical Graphics court to its holding. See supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
91 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 278 n.3.
Mobius Management Sys. v. Fourth Dimension Software, 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
" 820 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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basis for the former court's reasoning. The Garland court ex-
plained that the conclusion in American Needle turned not on the
fact that court believed the status of the person in receipt of the
letter was the most important factor, but the fact that it believed
that a private letter did not constitute "commercial advertising or
promotion.'9 In fact, one will find upon reading the American
Needle court's opinion that this interpretation is without merit.
While that court indeed considered important the fact that only a
single letter was involved, it clearly gave weight to the status of the
licensor in reaching its decision, contrasting his position with
retailers at a trade show, who are members of the purchasing
public. 5
C. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When interpreting the plain language of the statute, one will
observe that the disputed language contains a disjunctive, rather
than a conjunctive, phrase. It reads "commercial advertising or
promotion,'9 e not "commercial advertising and promotion." This
is significant in light of the Garland court's admission that it was
more difficult to assume the notion of public dissemination in the
definition of the word "promotion" than in that of "advertising."97
In fact, the Webster's definition of "promotion" is "active further-
ance of sale of merchandise through advertising or other publici-
ty.9' One will note that the word "publicity" is included, but as
part of a disjunctive phrase. This suggests that the meaning of the
term "promotion" is broader than that of the term "advertising,"
and accordingly that one should not attempt to draw bright lines
regarding its usage and interpretation, when it in fact may be
9 Id.
" To quote the court, "the difference is that public dissemination of false information to
retailers at a trade show would most likely constitute 'commercial advertising and
promotion,' while a single letter privately addressed to a non-consuming licensor does not."
820 F. Supp. at 1078. The construction of this sentence gives no indication that the court
considered any one factor to be controlling. In fact, "single letter," 'privately addressed," and
'nonconsuming licensor" all appear to have played a significant role in the court's final
analysis.
"Lanham Act § 43(a).
"7 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276.98Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1815 (1986)).
1996] 369
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capable of more than one meaning. A single correspondence fits
within this broad meaning.
It next becomes important to understand the definition of the
word "advertising," which includes "calling something ... to the
attention of the public .... .' It is not clear, however, exactly to
whom the term "public" refers. One need not immediately conclude
that "public" refers to the general public. One might just as easily
deduce that the term refers to the audience at hand. Application
of this meaning of the term to the Garland case causes the
consumer Diamond Everly to be inherently "public" because
Diamond Everly is the particular targeted audience at hand.
Consequently, if one were to adhere to the Garland court's line of
reasoning, meaning its plain meaning approach1" regarding the
meaning of the phrase "commercial advertising or promotion," one
could theoretically omit the concept of publicity or public dissemi-
nation from the definition of the language in contention.
The reasoning of the court in the aforementioned Mobius
Management Systems, Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc.1 °1
deserves praise. That court held that a letter sent by a competitor
to a single customer of the plaintiff could constitute "commercial
advertising or promotion" within the meaning of § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act even though the letter had not been disseminated to
the general public. In doing so, the court placed emphasis on the
fact that the letter had been presented directly to a company that
was known to be in the market for the product of both parties, and
that the letter was designed expressly to discourage the targeted
company from purchasing the plaintiffs product and to buy the
defendant's product instead. 2 The company in receipt of the
letter in that case comprised the true relevant purchasing pub-
lic.l0 3 One could make the same argument with respect to the
contractor Diamond Everly, and subsequently the Lawrence School
District. Further, the court in Mobius declared that the "commer-
cial advertising or promotion" requirement in the language of §
43(a) is meant to deny relief only in those cases where the dispar-
9Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 31-32 (1986)).
'Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 276.
o 880 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
'02 Id. at 1020, 1021.
'03 Id. at 1021.
[Vol. 3:353370
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aging remarks do not reach the people that mattered most under
§ 43(a) the Lanham Act-the consumers." One could infer that
the court in Mobius considered the effect on the purchasing
"audience" to be a much more important factor than the nature of
the communication, when that court made this determination
regarding an alleged § 43(a) violation.
That method of analysis is a sensible way to evaluate situations
such as those presented to the Garland court. The court in such a
case should give weight to the effects of the communication on the
consumer, which in this case is the contractor Diamond Everly,
whereas the vehicle and mode of communication itself should
receive little if any attention. To place such great emphasis on the
proper definitions of the terms "commercial advertising or promo-
tion" is to value form over substance and involves the use of
artificial distinctions. When it does so the court looks less at the
effect on the consumer and the consumer's ability to know the truth
and more at a formulaic method of decision which ignores commer-
cial realities." This formula ignores one of the aims of § 43(a),
which is to protect the consumer.1l 6
D. VALUE OF ALTERNATE REDRESS
Furthermore, the court's assertion that its decision does not
eliminate the torts of defamation, interference with contractual
relationships, or interference with business expectancy or economic
advantage as remedies for this type of harm °7 is not convincing
as a justification for denying the plaintiffs claim for this type of
disparaging communication. The existence of one remedy does not
justify elimination of another for a similar harm. In several ways
§ 43(a) is more comprehensive than, for instance, the common law
loId. at 1020.
" See Louis P. Petrich, Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders in
Copyright and Trademark Infringement Cases: The Trademark Counterfeiting Act, in
LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 1994, 751 (PLI
Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3925,
1994) (discussing role of consumer perception surveys to establish validity of false
advertising claim).
" See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
107 Garland, 895 F. Supp. at 279.
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tort of unfair competition; in fact, "such claims stand today on a
much better footing than under the common law rules," says one
prominent commentator." He recognizes that the statute creat-
ed a cause of action for an advertiser against its competitor if the
competitor made false or misleading claims about the advertiser's
product. The remedy at common law previously extended only to
false or misleading claims about the competitor's own product.
In addition, a plaintiff situated as he was in Garland would not
be able to obtain relief via a claim under the tort of interference
with contractual relationships. In this case a contract had not yet
been formed, nor had the parties (Garland and Diamond Everly)
even entered into negotiations with one another, as the defendant's
conduct in Garland prevented that from occurring. Therefore,
there was no contract with which the defendant might have
interfered.
Furthermore, a plaintiff such as Garland would fail in asserting
a claim under the common law tort of interference with prospective
advantage. Courts base liability in this context on a showing of
malice, which might be difficult for a plaintiff such as Garland to
prove."° A plaintiff will rarely prevail upon a showing of mere
negligence on the part of the defendant; he might only have success
if he can show there exists a special relationship between the
parties, which Garland could not do.110
The above scenarios illustrate the problem that many plaintiffs
will encounter-the common law will likely pose an obstacle in any
given situation a plaintiff faces.
E. CONCLUSIONS
A narrow interpretation of the language "commercial advertising
or promotion," as the court in Garland has implemented, will
deprive advertisers of their right to redress for legitimate unfair
competition claims resulting from competitor false advertising.
The court's ruling in Garland that a single correspondence does
'08 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1019
(5th ed. 1984).
'
09 Id. at 1008.
110 Id.
[Vol. 3:353372
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not constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" under § 43 of
the Lanham Act does not represent a real departure from existing
case law, in view of the various cases which have held similarly.
As the court in Garland observed, the case law is sparse and the
courts are split as to the meaning accorded the language "commer-
cial advertising or promotion." Nevertheless, the holding of
Garland extends an unrealistic doctrine that tends to ignore
commercial actualities in order to protect and adhere to a rigid
formula for determining whether certain communication constitutes
"commercial advertising or promotion."
The court's analysis represents an ivory tower assessment of a
commercial situation. The court has kept itself from recognizing
real effects on a real business transaction, brought about by unfair
business practices. It instead has elected to keep the availability
of remedies to a limited number by refusing to innovate. For
instance, "sufficient dissemination" of commercial materials, as
illustrated through the holdings of several cases, is a relative
concept. Accordingly, the court should recognize that to have an
effect on a person's business, a disparaging communication does not
have to be distributed nationwide; it only needs to reach the
consumer at hand. In the instant case it did and was absolutely
effective.
The court's holding in Garland will effectively penalize business-
es whose competitors utilize nontraditional advertising channels
and also will hurt the small businessman who is the victim of false
advertising initiated by his fellow small-business competitor.
Because the members of a smaller industry will presumably have
access to fewer resources and consequently to the instrumentalities
necessary to implement a traditional advertising campaign,
communications among the competitors and customers could go
unchecked because they do not fall under the formula promulgated
under a restrictive holding such as the one in Garland. Similarly,
the businessman whose competitor uses nontraditional promotional
methods, such as pamphlet distribution to individual clients with
each transaction, will also be harmed without redress under a
statute presumably enacted to protect him from this very phenome-
non.
Additionally, the small businessman engaged in interstate
commerce who depends on word-of-mouth advertising for much of
1996] 373
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his livelihood will be harmed by this type of holding. Disparage-
ments about his products or services made by his competitor via a
word-of-mouth "campaign" will harm him extensively, but he may
not receive relief under § 43(a).
These observations indicate that a more effective type of analysis
would start with an examination of the ends achieved by the
communication in each case, rather than focusing on the means of
communication itself. Otherwise, such a narrow interpretation of
§ 43(a) will effectively strip it of much of its protective power.
Finally, the court in Garland stated that the dual purposes of the
Lanham Act were, as indicated by legislative history, to protect the
public and to protect the trademark holder. This reference to the
intent behind the enactment of such legislation is ironic, because
through its opinion in favor of the defendant Ecology Roof Systems
Corporation, the court has furthered neither objective.
ASHLEY H. DRAUGHON
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